When data is stored on a faulty server that is accessed concurrently by multiple clients, the server may present inconsistent data to different clients. For example, the server might complete a write operation of one client, but respond with stale data to another client. Mazières and Shasha (PODC 2002) introduced the notion of forkconsistency, also called fork-linearizability, which ensures that the operations seen by every client are linearizable and guarantees that if the server causes the views of two clients to differ in a single operation, they may never again see each other's updates after that without the server being exposed as faulty. In this paper, we improve the communication complexity of their fork-linearizable storage access protocol with n clients from Ω(n 2 ) to O(n). We also prove that in every such protocol, a reader must wait for a concurrent writer. This explains a seeming limitation of their and of our improved protocol. Furthermore, we give novel characterizations of fork-linearizability and prove that it is neither stronger nor weaker than sequential consistency.
INTRODUCTION
Many users no longer keep all their data on local storage. Instead, their data often resides on remote, online service providers. Systems with such remotely stored information include network filesystems, online collaboration servers such as Wikis, source code repositories using versioning tools like CVS, and web-based email providers. Users rely on the provider to maintain the integrity of the stored data, but there is no generally available technology that allows a user to easily verify that no subtle modification has been Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. August 12-15, 2007 , Portland, Oregon, USA . introduced to the data. In other words, users must trust the storage provider.
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When the users locally maintain even a small amount of trusted memory, the trust in the storage provider can be greatly reduced using well-known cryptographic methods. A single, isolated user may verify the integrity of its remotely stored data by keeping a short hash value of the data in its local memory. When the volume of data is large, this method is usually implemented using a Merkle hash tree. But in multi-user environments, integrity should be guaranteed between a writer and multiple readers, for which hashing alone is not enough. Digital signatures achieve data integrity against modifications by the server when the users sign all their data. Every user only needs to store an authenticated signature public-key of the others or the root certificate of a public-key infrastructure in its trusted memory.
Neither of the above methods rules out all attacks by a faulty or malicious server. Even if all data is signed during write operations, the server might present the modifications in a different order to a client, it may decide to omit a recent update to some user and present a different subset of the write operations to another user.
In the model considered here, there are no common clocks and the clients do not communicate with each other. Some of the above attacks can therefore never be prevented. In particular, the server may use an outdated value in the reply to a reader and omit a more recent update. Mazières and Shasha [18] present a protocol called SUNDR that does not prevent such attacks, but makes them easily detectable. The SUNDR protocol ensures that whenever the server causes the views of two clients to differ in a single operation, the two clients may never again see each other's updates after that. Such partitioning can easily be detected through out-of-band communication.
Mazières and Shasha [18] introduced the notion of fork consistency for the properties that their protocol provides to a set of clients concurrently accessing the server. Fork-consistency ensures that every client sees a linearizable [11] history of read and write operations, i.e., one that is consistent with all operations observed by the client, such that the operations seen in the histories of all clients can be arranged in a "forking tree." Oprea and Reiter [19] suggested the name fork-linearizability for fork-consistency.
Contribution.
In this paper, we make two contributions. First, we investigate the notion of fork-linearizability of shared memory consisting of read/write registers. We show that every protocol emulating fork-linearizable shared memory on a possibly faulty server involves executions, where the server is correct but one client cannot complete an operation because it must wait for another client to perform some computation steps. In other words, no such emulation is obstruction-free [10] . This result explains a seeming limita-tion of the SUNDR protocol and of our protocol, where a reader must wait for a concurrent writer. This also explains why any asynchronous protocol emulating fork-linearizable shared memory, which guarantees that all operations by correct clients complete if the server is correct, must assume that clients do not fail. Next, we show that sequential consistency cannot be guaranteed with a possibly malicious server, and that fork-linearizability is neither stronger nor weaker than sequential consistency in the sense that fork-linearizable executions may not be sequentially consistent and vice versa. These results give further motivation for studying forking conditions. Furthermore, we give a "global" definition of forklinearizability in terms of a single sequential history of operations, of which the clients observe subsequences that respect the sequential specification.
Second, we provide an efficient protocol for emulating fork-linearizable shared memory on an untrusted server. Our protocol is inspired by the SUNDR protocol [18] and is also based on vector timestamps. In a system with n clients, our protocol improves the communication complexity to O(n) from Ω(n 2 ) in the SUNDR protocol. Intuitively, our improvement results from relying only on the vector timestamp of the client that executed the most recent operation, instead of relying on the vector timestamps of all clients.
Analogously to the work about SUNDR [18] , we present two protocols: a protocol that proceeds in "lock-step," where the server blocks during every client operation, and a "concurrent" protocol, where the clients may proceed at their own speed and interact concurrently with the server, up to the limitation mentioned above. We note that even though our protocol follows the general pattern of the SUNDR protocol, we need a new proof that it guarantees fork-linearizability. Our efficiency improvement comes at the cost of introducing certain vulnerabilities that may be exploited by faulty clients colluding with the server. The SUNDR protocol prevents some of these attacks by using n vector timestamps, although Mazières and Shasha [18] do not formally state any properties about the SUNDR protocol with faulty clients.
To see the significance of our contribution, consider a widely used Internet-based storage system with thousands of registered users. Suppose that n = 10000. Our algorithm and the SUNDR protocol both require that at least one timestamp per user is sent during every operation, i.e., typically at least 4 Bytes. Thus, whereas our algorithm will send 4n = 40KB per operation, the SUNDR protocol will require to send 4n 2 = 380MB per operation.
Related work. The SUNDR protocol [18] has been implemented in a practical distributed filesystem called SUNDR [14] , which provides fork-linearizable semantics for its "fetch" and "modify" operations. SUNDR demonstrates that ensuring fork-linearizability in network filesystems is practical. There are many distributed filesystems that rely on digital signatures for checking the integrity of the stored data, but only SUNDR prevents attacks on the consistency of the client views through fork-linearizability. Oprea and Reiter [19] generalize fork-linearizability and introduce, among other notions, the interesting concept of fork-sequential-consistency, where the sequence of read and write operations seen by every client is only required to be sequentially consistent. They investigate cryptographic filesystems, where a high-level encrypted file object is implemented by a file-key object and a filedata object stored on an untrusted server.
There is a rich literature on verifying the correctness of untrusted memories without concurrent access by using hashing. It ranges from the fundamental work of Blum et al. [3] to investigations on "incremental" hash functions [5] , motivated by the goal to construct secure processors with untrusted main memory [6] . Hash trees have also been used in several filesystems, starting with Fu's work [8] and the SFSRO filesystem [7] .
Finally, it is worth pointing out that this paper does not address the question of emulating shared memory on a set of storage servers, of which a fraction may fail or deviate in arbitrary ways from their specification [17, 1] . These emulations do not provide any guarantees with a majority of faulty servers, unlike the protocols considered here.
Outlook. Our work can be extended in several directions. Our proof that waiting is necessary in fork-linearizable executions does not apply to fork-sequentially-consistent executions. Thus, protocols emulating the weaker notion of fork-sequential-consistency (defined in Section 2) are potentially more efficient and more robust. Another important avenue for future work is to consider faulty clients and to investigate communication-efficient protocols that achieve forking consistency conditions in this model. Some simple precautions by the server, such as checking signatures and orderings, may already prevent many attacks by malicious clients. But formal consistency notions taking into account faulty clients are necessary to capture this realistic situation. It would also be interesting to provide lower bounds on the communication complexity of fork-linearizable emulations and to investigate the use of other methods for ensuring causal order between operations.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Definitions are presented in Section 2. The three results that characterize fork-linearizability are contained in Section 3. Section 4 describes the lock-step protocol to emulate forklinearizable shared memory, and Section 5 presents the emulation allowing concurrent operations.
DEFINITIONS 2.1 System Model
The system consists of n clients C1, . . . , Cn and a server S that are modeled as I/O Automata [16, 15] . Clients and servers are collectively called parties. All clients are assumed to be correct and to follow the protocol. The server, however, may be faulty and deviate arbitrarily from its protocol, exhibiting so-called "Byzantine" [20] or "NR-arbitrary" faults [12] .
The parties interact by sending messages over an asynchronous network which consists of reliable point-to-point links. We wish to design a protocol where the server provides a shared functionality F to the clients; the functionality is defined using terminology from the "shared memory model" of distributed computation. F is similar to a shared object, but may violate liveness because the server that implements it may be faulty. Our goal will be to show that the protocol constrains the server so that it simulates to the clients an interaction with F .
The clients interact with the functionality F by accessing operations provided by F . An operation is defined in terms of two events occuring at the client, denoting the invocation and the completion of the operation. These two events are sometimes also called request and response, respectively. An operation is invoked on a client at some point in time and completes at a later point in time when a response from F reaches the client. An operation o1 is said to precede another operation o2 whenever o1 completes before o2 is invoked. Two operations are called sequential if one of them precedes the other one and concurrent otherwise. A sequence of events is called sequential if it only contains sequential operations.
An execution of the system consists of a sequence of events and internal state transitions at the parties and is asynchronous.
The clients generate arbitrary sequences of requests for F , but we assume that clients always interact sequentially with a given functionality, i.e., the sequence of events on a client consists of alternating invocations and matching responses, starting with an invocation. A functionality may further require that clients comply with problem-specific restrictions on the allowed sequences of requests.
The functionality F is defined via a sequential specification, which indicates the behavior of F when all interactions between the clients and F are sequential.
Read/Write Registers
The basic functionality that we consider is a read/write register X. It is defined as follows. The register stores a value v from a domain V and offers a read and a write operation. Initially, every register contains a special value ⊥ ∈ V . When a client Ci invokes the read operation, denoted readi(X), the functionality responds by returning a value v, denoted readi(X) → v. When Ci invokes the write operation with a value v, denoted writei(X, v), the response of X is an acknowledgment OK. The sequential specification of X requires that each read operation from X returns the value written by the most recent preceding write operation, if there is one, and the initial value otherwise. We assume that the values written to any particular register are unique. This can easily be implemented by including the identity of the writer and a sequence number together with the stored value.
Registers come in several variations [13] depending on whether one or more clients can invoke its operations. In this paper, we consider single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) registers, where for every register, only a designated "writer" may invoke the write operation, but any client may invoke the read operation. The functionality considered here consists of n SWMR read/write registers X1, . . . , Xn. The registers are usually identified by their indices and may be accessed independently of each other.
Consistency Conditions
When a shared functionality is accessed by concurrent operations, the sequential specification alone may not be powerful enough to provide a meaningful semantics to the clients. In this subsection, we define three different consistency conditions with respect to a shared functionality under concurrent access. Two of them are well-known [2] : sequential consistency and linearizability. The third one, fork-linearizability, has been introduced by Mazières and Shasha [18] under the name of fork-consistency in the context of storage systems that may deviate from their specification. Implementing a fork-linearizable shared memory with an untrusted server is the main goal of this work.
A consistency condition is expressed in terms of the sequence of events that the shared functionality may exhibit in an execution, as observed by the clients. Such a sequence is also called a history; a history σ is said to be complete whenever all invocations in σ have a matching response.
Definition 1 (Preservation of real-time order).
A permutation π of a sequence of events σ is said to preserve the real-time order of σ if for every operation o that precedes an operation o in σ, the operation o also precedes o in π.
An important consistency condition is linearizability [11] , which guarantees that all operations occur "atomically," i.e., appear to be executed at a single point in time.
Definition 2 (Linearizability [11]).
A sequence of events σ observed by the clients demonstrates linearizability with respect to a functionality F if and only if there exists a sequential permutation π of σ such that:
1. π preserves the real-time order of σ; and 2. The operations of π satisfy the sequential specification of F .
In other words, a sequence of operations on a functionality is linearizable if there is a way to reorder the operations into a sequential execution that respects the semantics of the functionality and that respects the ordering of events as seen by a global observer.
Sequential consistency is a weaker notion than linearizability and only imposes a total order on the events observed by every client in isolation.
Definition 3 (Sequential consistency).
A sequence of events σ observed by the clients demonstrates sequential consistency with respect to a functionality F if and only if there exists a sequential permutation π of σ such that:
1. For every client Ci, the restriction of π to the events occuring at Ci preserves the real-time order of σ restricted to the events occurring at Ci; and 2. The operations of π satisfy the sequential specification of F .
Neither linearizability nor sequential consistency can be achieved when F is implemented on a Byzantine server (at least not for functionalities F where some operations do not commute). For instance, suppose that Ci was the last client to execute an operation on F ; no matter what protocol the clients use to interact with the server, a faulty server might roll back its internal memory to the point in time before executing the operation on behalf of Ci, and pretend to a client Cj that Ci's operation did not occur. As long as Cj and Ci do not communicate with each other, neither party can detect this violation and thus neither definition can be satisfied (for a formal proof, see Section 3.3).
Mazières and Shasha [18] called such behavior a forking attack. They postulate that forking two (sets of) clients by introducing discrepancies between the events observed by them is the only way in which a faulty server may violate the consistency of a functionality that it provides. In particular, it should be ruled out that the server causes any common operation to be observed by two distinct clients after they have been forked, i.e., to join the sequences of observed operations again. In the above example, Ci should not see any data written by Cj after the forking attack.
The notion of fork-linearizability [18] captures this intuition by requiring that the history of events occuring at every client satisfies the conditions of linearizability and that for any operation visible to multiple clients, the history of events occuring before the operation is the same.
Definition 4 (Fork-Linearizability).
A sequence of events σ observed by the clients is called fork-linearizable with respect to a functionality F if and only if for each client Ci, there exists a subsequence σi of σ consisting only of completed operations and a sequential permutation πi of σi such that:
1. All completed operations in σ occurring at client Ci are contained in σi; and 2. πi preserves the real-time order of σi; and 3. The operations of πi satisfy the sequential specification of F ; and 4. For every o ∈ πi ∩ πj , the sequence of events that precede o in πi is the same as the sequence of events that precede o in πj.
Note that a fork-linearizable history that does not fork and satisfies πi = π for all clients is linearizable. Moreover, conditions 2 and 3 imply that each σi is linearizable with respect to F .
Oprea and Reiter [19] consider forking attacks not only for linearizable implementations but also with other consistency conditions. For instance, they define the notion of fork-sequential-consistency; but we do not address it in this work.
Byzantine Emulations
Our goal is to provide a protocol for the clients that emulates a functionality F with the help of server S under a given consistency condition. Such a protocol P consists of n identical algorithms running locally on every client and one algorithm running on the server (when it is correct). The algorithms may send messages to each other over the network. We define an emulation in terms of events observed by the clients when they run P , and require that the sequence of these events correspond to a possible interaction of the clients with F .
Our notion of Byzantine emulation is derived from the definition of a fault-tolerant implementation of a shared object by Jayanti et al. [12] . It differs from the latter with respect to handling nonresponsive faults of the server and by allowing forking attacks. If the server is faulty, any functionality that it should emulate may have operations that do not complete, causing the emulation to violate liveness; furthermore, the server may fork two clients in arbitrary ways. The intuition behind our notion of Byzantine emulation is that introducing forks and violating liveness are also the only possible ways in which the protocol execution may differ from an interaction of the clients with F . If the server is correct, of course, the emulation has to satisfy liveness and must not fork.
An execution of a system is called admissible when the requests generated by the clients comply with the problem-specific restrictions for F and the execution satisfies "fairness." Fairness means, informally, that the execution does not halt prematurely, when there are still steps to be taken or messages to be delivered; we refer to the standard literature for a formal definition [15, 2] .
Definition 5 (Fork-linearizable Byzantine emulation).
We say that a protocol P for a set of clients emulates a functionality F on a Byzantine server S with fork-linearizability if and only if in every admissible execution of P , the sequence of events observed by the clients is fork-linearizable with respect to F . Moreover, if S is correct, then every admissible execution is complete and has a linearizable history.
We remark that for other consistency conditions Γ such as sequential consistency, the notion of a fork-Γ-consistent Byzantine emulation may be defined analogously.
Cryptographic Primitives
The protocols of this paper require hash functions and digital signatures from cryptography. Because the focus of this work is on concurrency and correctness and not on cryptography, we model both as ideal functionalities implemented by a trusted entity.
A hash function maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a short, unique representation. The functionality provides only a single operation H; its invocation takes a bit string x as parameter and returns an integer h with the response. The implementation maintains a list L of all x that have been queried so far. When H is invoked with x ∈ L, then H responds with the index of x in L; otherwise, H adds x to L at the end and returns its index. This ideal implementation models only collision-resistance but no other properties of real hash functions. The server may also invoke H.
The functionality of the digital signature scheme provides two operations, sign and verify. 
ON FORK-LINEARIZABILITY
This section contains three results that characterize the notion of fork-linearizability. We first show that no protocol for forklinearizable shared memory emulation on a faulty server is obstruction free, then provide an alternative definition of fork-linearizability, and finally demonstrate that fork-linearizability is incomparable with sequential consistency.
Waiting is Necessary
It is well-understood that lock-based algorithms for synchronizing concurrent access to shared data are problematic and that waitfree [9] synchronization methods are desirable and often more efficient. A wait-free algorithm ensures that any client may complete any operation in a finite number of steps, regardless of the execution speeds of the other clients. Weaker progress conditions have also been introduced, and include lock-freedom, fw-termination [1] , and obstruction freedom [10] . In an obstruction-free algorithm, every operation of a correct client is guaranteed to complete eventually when the client is allowed to take enough steps alone, without other clients taking steps, i.e., when there is no contention.
In this section, we show that any emulation of fork-linearizable shared memory with a possibly faulty server must involve executions where some client is delayed by another client. The basic idea of the proof is to consider a read operation by Pj and then a write operation by Pi along with a series of concurrent read operations by Pj. The first read operation must return the old value of Pi's register. But if one of Pj 's reads occurs after the very last message from Pi to the server, then fork-linearizability requires the read operation to return the newly written value. Thus, at some point the read operations of Pj switch from returning the old value to returning the new value. We argue formally that the point at which this switch occurs creates an opportunity for a faulty server to violate fork-consistency. The only solution around this problem is for the concurrent reader to wait.
Theorem 1. Let P be a protocol for emulating n ≥ 1 SWMR registers on a Byzantine server S with fork-linearizability. Then there is an execution of P where S is correct and an operation of some client cannot complete unless another client takes some steps.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume that in all states of every execution of P in which S is correct and a client Ci has invoked an operation o that has not yet completed, there is a continuation of the execution that includes the completion of o and that consists entirely of events and transitions of S and of Ci.
Recall that protocol P describes the asynchronous interaction of Ci with S for emulating o. We assume w.l.o.g. that the emulation of o consists of an exchange of messages a1, b1, a2, b2, . . . , b k , a k+1 between S and Ci, where Ci first sends a1, and for j = 1, 2, . . . , k, the server sends bj in response to receiving aj and Ci sends aj+1 in response to receiving bj . Message b k is the last message from S and o completes only after Ci receives it; message a k+1 may be missing, in which case the emulation of o ends with b k .
We construct an execution α, in which S is correct. The execution is shown in Figure 1 and consists of operations by clients C1 and C2 that access only one register X1. First, C1 executes w Figure 1 .
Concurrently
Observe the values returned by the read operations r . Client C2 cannot distinguish execution α from α and returns u as in α. But this violates linearizability, which must be preserved in α because S is correct.
Thus, the first read r Note that C1 cannot distinguish execution γ from β and C2 cannot distinguish γ from a prefix of α. Executions α and β are both linearizable with a correct server. But γ is not fork-linearizable because the subsequences σ2 and π2 according to Definition 4 would have to include all operations of γ, and γ is not linearizable. Hence, the faulty server can violate fork-linearizability in γ, contradicting the requirement that protocol P allows only fork-linearizable executions.
We have shown that no read operation among r in execution α returns neither u nor v. This contradicts our assumption that in every execution with a correct server, any operation of a client may always complete without waiting for another client to take any steps.
This result explains why in the concurrent algorithm of Mazières and Shasha [18] and in our concurrent algorithm of Section 5, a read operation is blocked until a concurrent write operation has completed. Let us extend the standard terminology [9, 12] and call an emulation protocol using a Byzantine server S wait-free if every client Ci that has invoked an operation can complete the operation together with a correct S from any state of its execution, even when no other client takes any steps. Theorem 1 implies that no forklinearizable emulation of n ≥ 1 SWMR registers on a Byzantine server is wait-free.
If we consider a slightly more general model, where clients may fail by crashing, we also obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. No protocol for emulating n ≥ 1 SWMR registers on a Byzantine server with fork-linearizability is obstruction-free.
Proof. According to Theorem 1, there exist executions in which the server is correct and a client Ci must wait for another client Cj to take steps. Now, if Cj crashes, Ci remains blocked forever because it has no way to distinguish the situation from a situation with a slow network. This situation is obviously obstruction-free since a crashed client does not take any steps.
Global Fork-Linearizability
The existing definition of fork-linearizability requires that all operations of a history σ can be arranged in a "forking tree" such that the history on every branch, represented by σi, is linearizable; that is, for every Ci, there exists a sequential permutation πi of σi that preserves the real-time order of σi and satisfies the sequential specification of the functionality. We show here that this notion of fork-linearizability is equivalent to the seemingly stronger notion in which there exists a "global," sequential permutation π of σ that respects the real-time order of σ. The histories πi are merely subsequences of π. This clarifies the notion of fork-linearizability and may lead to simpler arguments about protocols emulating forklinearizable behavior.
Definition 6 (Global Fork-Linearizability).
A sequence of events σ observed by the clients demonstrates global fork-linearizability with respect to a functionality F if and only if there exists a sequential permutation π of σ such that:
1. π preserves the real-time order of σ; and 2. For each client Ci, there exists a subsequence πi of π such that:
(a) All events in π occurring at client Ci are contained in πi; and (b) The operations of πi satisfy the sequential specification of F ; and (c) For every o ∈ πi ∩ πj , the sequence of events that precede o in πi is the same as the sequence of events that precede o in πj.
We prove the following theorem in the full version [4] .
Theorem 3. A sequence of events is fork-linearizable if and only if it is globally fork-linearizable.

Comparing with Sequential Consistency
Recall that every linearizable history is trivially fork-linearizable and that there is no protocol that provides a linearizable emulation of even one SWMR register on a Byzantine server S. But this does not rule out that S may emulate a register with a weaker consistency notion. Sequential consistency, for example, does not have to preserve the real-time order of operations. It would be acceptable for a correct server to return old register values, as long as it preserves the relative order in which it shows them to every client. However, we show in the following theorem that a faulty server may also violate sequential consistency when it emulates more than one register.
Theorem 4. There is no protocol that emulates n > 1 SWMR registers on a Byzantine server with sequential consistency.
Proof. For any protocol P which emulates two SWMR registers X1 and X2, we demonstrate an execution λ involving a faulty server S which violates sequential consistency.
The execution consists of four operations by the clients C1 and C2. Client C1 executes write1(X1, v) → OK and read1(X2) → ⊥. The server interacts with C1 as if it was the only client executing any operation. Concurrently, C2 executes write2(X2, v) → OK and read2(X1) → ⊥ and S also pretends to C2 that it is the only client executing any operation. Such "split-brain" behavior is obviously possible when S is faulty: it can act as if the write operations to X1 and X2 have completed, as far as the writing client is concerned, but still return the old values of X1 and X2 in the read operations. Since the only interaction of the clients is with S, neither client can distinguish execution λ from a sequentially consistent execution where it executes alone.
Notice λ is not sequentially consistent: There is no permutation of the operations in λ in which the sequential specification of both X1 and X2 is preserved and, at the same time, the order of operations occurring at each client is the same as their real-time order in λ. Specifically, in any possible permutation of λ, the operation read1(X2) → ⊥ cannot be positioned after write2(X2, v), since the read would have to return v = ⊥ according to the sequential specification of X2. However, read1(X2) → ⊥ may neither occur before write2(X2, v) as we now argue. Since the local order of operations has to be the same as in λ in this case, write1(X1, u) must occur before read1(X2) → ⊥ and hence also before write2 (X2, v) . But since the latter operation precedes read2(X1) → ⊥ in the local order seen by C2, we conclude that write1(X1, u) precedes read2(X1) → ⊥, which contradicts the sequential specification of X1. Thus, λ is not sequentially consistent.
Note that execution λ constructed in the proof above is forklinearizable but not sequentially consistent. On the other hand, execution γ exhibited in the proof of Theorem 1 and shown in Figure 1 is sequentially consistent but not fork-linearizable. Hence, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5. Fork-linearizability is neither stronger nor weaker than sequential consistency.
A SIMPLE IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present a simple protocol that implements a shared memory on a Byzantine server S and guarantees forklinearizability. It is called the lock-step protocol and is derived from the bare-bones protocol of Mazières and Shasha [18] , but achieves the same task more efficiently. Whereas their bare-bones protocol requires messages of size Ω(n 2 ), the size of the messages in our lock-step protocol is O(n).
In the lock-step protocol, a client sends a SUBMIT message containing a request to server S. Upon accepting the request, S sends a REPLY message with current state information to the client and stops accepting further requests, until it receives a final COMMIT message from the client. Hence, the name lock-step protocol. The detailed protocol is shown in Algorithms 1 and 2. The main result about the lock-step protocol is the following theorem, proved in the full version [4] .
Theorem 6. The lock-step protocol described in Algorithms 1 and 2 emulates n SWMR registers on a Byzantine server with fork linearizability.
Algorithm 1 Lock-step protocol, algorithm for client Ci. wait for a message REPLY, V, , ϕ from S
8:
if not V = (0, . . . , 0) or verify (ϕ , COMMIT V )
9:
and T ≤ V and
10:
13:
send COMMIT 
25:
send COMMIT, T, ϕ, x, σ to S
26:
return y Description. Our shared memory consists of n SWMR registers X1, . . . , Xn with domain V; client Ci may write only to Xi but read from any register. The domain V of a register is arbitrary. In practice, however, an array of fixed-size registers can provide consistent access to an array of arbitrarily large data sets through using a hash tree [14] . Every client locally maintains a timestamp that it increments during every operation. We call a vector of n such timestamps a version vector or simply a version; it acts as a vector clock for ordering operations. We define a partial order on version vectors. For two version vectors u and v, we say that u is smaller than or equal to
, n. We say that u is smaller than v, denoted u < v, if and only if u ≤ v and u[i] < v[i] for some i.
The state of the client consists of a version vector T representing its most recently completed operation, together with a copy of its own data valuex. For simplicity of the protocol description, the client storesx and writes it back during every read operation.
The server S maintains an array X, representing the register values, where entry X[i] represents Xi and is a pair of the form (xi, σi) ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * . The string xi contains the actual value, and σi is a digital signature by Ci on the string VALUE xi ti, where ti is a timestamp equal to Ci's own timestamp T [i] at the time of completing the operation that wrote xi. Furthermore, S keeps information related to the most recently executed operation: the version vector V of the operation, the identity c of the client performing the operation, and a digital signature ϕ by Cc on V .
When a client Ci invokes an operation, it sends the request to the server in a SUBMIT message. The server sends a REPLY message, containing the version vector V and the accompanying signature ω from the most recently completed operation. In a read operation for register j, the server also sends (xj, σj ), representing the current value of the register. The server then waits for another message from Ci and does not process any messages from other clients.
The client verifies that the reply contains valid data: the version Algorithm 2 Lock-step protocol, algorithm for server S. 1: state 2:
initially (⊥, ⊥), for i = 1, . . . , n 4: 
16:
wait for receiving a message COMMIT, T, ϕ, x, σ from C i 17:
18:
V must be at least as big as its own version T , the i-th entry of V must correspond to the i-th entry of T , and the signature on COMMIT V must be valid. In a read operation, the client also verifies the signature on the data value and the associated timestamp. When a client detects any inconsistency in the reply, it considers the server to be Byzantine and stops the execution. In practice, the client might generate an alarm in this situation and alert an operator to invoke a recovery procedure. After Ci has successfully verified the reply, it adopts the received version V as its own version T , increments its timestamp T [i], and signs the new version T , resulting in a signature ϕ. It also signs its own value together with T [i]. Then it sends a COMMIT message to S, containing the T , ϕ, its value x and the signature on
The server then stores T and ϕ as its version V and signature ω from the most recent operation, and updates X[i] with the received value and signature.
Complexity. All messages sent in the protocol have size O(n + |x|+κ), where |x| denotes an upper bound on the length of the register values and κ denotes the length of a digital signature. Hence, the protocol uses network bandwidth economically. In particular, this improves the communication complexity of the bare-bones protocol of Mazières and Shasha [18] by an order of magnitude; their protocol achieves the same guarantees, but has communication complexity Ω(n 2 + nκ + |x|).
A CONCURRENT IMPLEMENTATION
In the lock-step protocol, when a correct server executes an operation o submitted by a client, it is not allowed to start processing any other request until o completes. This section extends the protocol to allow concurrent processing of independent operations, while maintaining O(n) communication complexity. When the server follows the protocol and the execution is admissible, every client may complete its operations independently of the speed of other clients, unless the two operations depend on each other. A write operation never depends on another operation, whereas a read operation depends on the most recent write operation to the same register. Hence, if the server receives a write operation o and later a read operation o from the same register, it blocks o until o completes. As shown in Section 3.1, blocking is unavoidable for any protocol that emulates shared memory on a Byzantine server with fork-linearizability. 
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or Vx = (0, . . . , 0) then halt 33:
35: The protocol for clients is presented in Algorithms 3 and 4, and the protocol for the server appears in Algorithm 5. Our protocol follows the general lines of the concurrent version of the SUNDR protocol [18] , and improves the communication complexity from Ω(n 2 ) to O(n), while providing the same guarantees. In the full version [4] , we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 7. The concurrent protocol emulates n SWMR registers on a Byzantine server with fork-linearizability.
Description. We first describe the algorithm of the clients (all line numbers refer to Algorithms 3 and 4). Every client locally maintains a version vector V old , which acts as a vector clock similarly to the lock-step protocol, and a list M old of missing proofs, which holds information about operations that were concurrent to the client's previous operation. The client also maintains the latest written valuew.
A client invokes an operation by sending a SUBMIT message to the server, which includes an announcement, consisting of a tuple of the form (c, oc, v, l, τ ) , where c is the index of the client submitting the operation, oc is the operation code (READ or WRITE), v is the sequence number of this operation, l is the register being Algorithm 4 Concurrent protocol, algorithm for client Ci, part 2.
46:
or V S = (0, . . . , 0) then halt 47: remove (oc, E) from M read (relevant only for read operations), and τ is a signature. The server sends back a REPLY message, containing a data structure Sinfo representing the operation which committed with the largest version vector thus far. In the client code, this operation is denoted by oS, the associated version vector by VS, and the associated list of missing proofs by MS.
Announcements are used by the server to notify a client invoking a new operation op about all uncommitted operations that started after oS had committed and that were scheduled by the server before op. Specifically, the announcement of a new operation is appended to a list C of concurrent operations that is maintained by the server, and this list is sent in the REPLY message to clients. The last operation in C received from the server during operation op is always op itself. A client Ci, executing op computes its new version vector by taking VS as a base, and incrementing the entries corresponding to every client Cc having an operation in C (lines 52-57). Since op is in C as well, the i-th entry of the vector is always incremented as in the lock-step protocol. When encountering an operation by client Cc in C, Ci first checks that VS reflects all previous operations of that client. Otherwise the server must be faulty and the execution is halted.
In the algorithm as described thus far, a client cannot know whether the operations in C are presented in the same order to other clients, and whether these operations are really concurrent, i.e., that the server did not just retransmit some old announcements. To solve this problem, every version vector is augmented by a list of missing proofs M, as described next.
When a client Ci executing an operation o encounters an announcement of an operation o in C, it is able to predict the version vector V that should be committed by o , if o and o receive consistent information about concurrent operations from the server. Operation o then includes the pair (o , H(V )) in its Mnew, which it sends to the server in its COMMIT message. When o commits, it signs and sends its real new version vector Vnew to the server. The server then uses the pair (o , H(Vnew)) as a proof to other clients, which they use to remove (o , h V ) from M, by comparing the "proof," H(Vnew), to the expected version vector hash, h V , in verify-proofs (line 51). We thus call operations in M unverified. Proofs are transmitted in a set P in the REPLY message. Since clients execute operations sequentially, no operation by client Ci could be unverified during op (line 59), and no client can have more than one unverified operation (line 60).
As mentioned above, when a client Ci commits, it sends to the server Mnew, a list that includes all operations known to Ci that remain unverified. The server stores all information included in Ci's latest COMMIT message. Additionally, Mnew is saved by Ci in the local variable M old . When a new operation o by Ci starts, it receives MS (the Mnew list sent to the server as oS committed). If o is a read operation of register l, Ci additionally receives Mx which is the Mnew list included in C l 's latest COMMIT message. The client then initializes Mnew for the new operation with MS (line 50). Next, using verify-proofs procedure, the client verifies (i.e., removes from Mnew) all operations that match a proof included in P. If there is a proof in P for some operation o such that the hash of the real (signed) version vector committed by o (as appears in P) does not match the one saved with o in Mnew, the server must be Byzantine and the execution is halted. Next, as was already mentioned, all operations that appear in C are added to Mnew together with a hash of the version vector the operation is expected to sign upon completion (line 57).
In order to simplify the presentation of the protocol and the proof, we define an order on version-vector/list-of-missing-proof pairs. A similar order, but for different data structures, was used by Maziè-res and Shasha [18] . A read operation by client Cr from register l receives additional information in the REPLY message from the server. Specifically, it receives Xinfo committed by C l (the client that writes to register l), which includes the written data, x, the version vector of the operation that wrote the data, Vx, and the missing proof list Mx. Although client Cr executing the read cannot generally know if the server returns data corresponding to the latest preceding committed operation by C l , Cr can make sure that it itself is not aware of a later operation by C l . If there are no unverified operations by Algorithm 5 Concurrent protocol, algorithm for server S.
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C ∈ Operations * , initially empty // list of concurrent operations 3: 
24:
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26:
remove from C the prefix of operations up to (including) op We now describe the server code (all line numbers refer to Algorithm 5). The server maintains in X[i] all information committed by the last operation of client Ci. It additionally maintains the list C of concurrent operations. The server stores in c the identifier of the client that committed with the largest version vector out of all committed operations thus far. The server code consists of two procedures (lines 7-21 and lines 22-26), which operate on common variables. Only one of the procedures is allowed to run at any given time, but if the processing of an operation is blocked on line 11, another operation can be processed meanwhile, and when the blocking condition is satisfied, processing of the blocked operation will be able to resume when no process executes either procedure. The queue of pending operations, i.e., which wait for a permission to enter one of the procedures, is implicitly managed as a FIFO queue. When a REPLY message is sent to a client Ci for its operation o, the list C always includes o as its last operation. When an operation o commits and has the largest version vector out of all operations that committed thus far, the server updates c. Furthermore, S may delete the prefix of C up to o. Intuitively, this is done since all important information about this prefix can be deducted from information committed by o.
The first procedure (lines 7-21) deals with the receipt of a SUB-MIT message from a client Ci. If the submitted operation is a read from register l, and there is a write operation by client C l (the only client that writes to l) that was received by the server before the read but which COMMIT message was not yet received, then Ci's read is blocked until this operation by C l completes. Note that if the server is correct, the operation must be either in C or in Mc.
The server then examines the list of missing proofs Mc that it sends to Ci, and collects in P all necessary "proofs" it has for operations in this list. These are tuples containing an operation and the hash of the actual version vector committed by the operation. Then, S sends a REPLY message, which includes the data committed by operation oc which had the largest version vector thus far (was scheduled later than any other operation that committed), including its associated list of missing proofs Mc. The REPLY message also contains the data requested by the client, the list C of concurrent operations, and P.
When a COMMIT message is received from client Ci (lines 22-26), the received information is saved in X [i] , and if the committed operation has a greater version vector then the operation committed by c, then c becomes i and the prefix of C up to the newly committed operation is deleted. The server's code does not include any checks for correctness of the client responses because we assume that clients are correct. Such checks could be added easily (the server can calculate precisely with what version vector and missing proof list a client is supposed to commit).
Complexity. During an execution of operation op by client Ci, all operations in C (other than op itself) are inserted into Mnew and then Ci checks that there is at most one operation by each client in Mnew, and no operations by Ci. Thus, the size of C is bounded by the size of n − 1 operations, i.e. O(nκ), where κ denotes the maximal length of digital signatures and hashes. For the same reason, any list of missing proofs can contain at most n − 1 operation/hash pairs, thus its size is O(nκ) as well. Furthermore, P has at most n − 1 entries because M has at most n − 1 entries, and the size of P is also O(nκ). Using |x| to denote an upper bound on the length of register values, the communication complexity of the protocol when run with a correct server is therefore O(nκ + |x|).
A faulty server could obviously send larger messages. Because most data sent by S must successfully verify a signature issued by a client, together with including some additional checks, we can actually guarantee a stronger notion: whenever a client completes an operation, its communication complexity was no more than O(nκ + |x|). The additional checks in the verify-proofs procedure should check that no operation is included more than once in P and that every operation oc with a "proof" in P is actually needed because it is in M.
This improves the complexity of the concurrent SUNDR protocol [18] by an order of magnitude; the protocol provides the same guarantees, in the same model, but has communication complexity O(n 2 + n(κ + |x|)), which remains its worst-case complexity even with the bandwidth optimizations suggested therein.
Observe that writing during read operations is not necessary, however if read operations do not update the version of the data, a reader of the data must be able to distinguish stale data from data that was not updated by read operations. This can be solved by maintaining two version vectors instead of one, one for the number of write operations only, while the other counts the total number of operations. We have avoided this for simplifying the presentation.
